Iran’s nuclear program has been the focus of the global non proliferation efforts since reservations had been raised with regards to Iran’s nuclear enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and the allegedly hidden agenda behind Iran’s nuclear program.i.e., the possibility of a secret Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Since early 1974, Iran has been a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non nuclear weapon state. However, in early 2002 concerns were raised over allegedly Iran’s violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and sanctions were imposed on Iran for these violations. These were based on the nature and the manner in which the Iranian nuclear program developed but more so by the declarations of the dissident Iranian Resistance Council revealed that Iran had not completely declared its nuclear activities and was in fact building two secret facilities, which were under construction; a uranium enrichment facility in Nantaz, and heavy water facility in Arak. And, this was in reality part of Iran’s secret attempt to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
Iran, however, had maintained that it had the right to enrich and reprocess uranium and it was her inalienable right as per the article IV of the NPT and part of the permissible activities under the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Therefore, the non decorations were not a violation but a regulation of the said procedures. Nonetheless, the IAEA board of governors in 2003 maintained that it must be given access to the facilities, where as per the NPT IAEA inspections could only be initiated six months before the nuclear material is introduced in facility but not before that.
The additional measures for extension were added to the NPT framework in 1992 after the Iraq War where after it was argued that existing safeguard measures were not sufficient but required an enhanced access to the facilities almost minimum six months in advance before a facility go critical (i.e., nuclear material could be introduced). Consequently, the IAEA Board of Governors decided that facilities should be reported during the planning phase, even before construction began. Iran agreed to it after 2003 as an interim step towards transparency and engagement.
The managed access was not received as a sufficient step by the IAEA and in 2003, the IAEA reported: “it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored.”
Iran was found in violation of its obligation to inform the IAEA of its importation of uranium from China ( materials were found after the IAEA inspections started)and subsequent use of that material in uranium conversion and enrichment activities. The said two activities were perceived as deliberate attempts by Iran to hide its secret nuclear program. The Iranian position on the issue remained that it had the right to enrich and reprocess as per the NPT and these were at best irregularities, and not an indication of a secret nuclear weapons program.
The dead lock remained between Iran and the United States over the issue and in 2003 the IAEA board reported the list of “breaches” and said there was a ‘pattern of concealment’ in the Iranian declarations. November 2003 IAEA report stated that it found “no evidence” that the previously undeclared activities were related to a nuclear weapons program, but also that it was unable to conclude that ‘Iran’s nuclear program was exclusively peaceful’.
A negotiating process started with the aid of the EU(the United Kingdom, France, and Germany on behalf of the EU) and Iran as a result Iran agreed to enhanced safeguards measures and implementation of the additional protocol on voluntary basis. For two years the engagement process remained alive but on 24 September 2005, the IAEA Board found that Iran had been in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and on 4 February 2006, the 35 member IAEA board of Governors voted 27–3 (with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia , Libya and South Africa) against the Iranian position and the Iranian nuclear program and its alleged violation was reported to the UN Security Council. Consequently , the UNSC passed a resolution and sanctions were imposed on the Iranian nuclear program.
What is interesting is that as per the NPT there is no treaty provision under which the matter could have been reported to the UNSC let alone be accompanied with a set of economic sanctions. The measure had been supported and led by the U.S. and United Kingdom and France and was followed by U.S. nuclear related sanctions and eventually the EU restrictive measures and economic sanctions. Iran as a response move stopped its unilateral adherence to the additional safeguards measures. The deadlock emerged between U.S. and Iran and with time the net sanctions were increased and so was the speed and scale of Iran’s nuclear activities which included construction of nuclear facilities in Isfahan.
In short, from 2006-20011, Iran was termed as the most ‘dangerous proliferator’, which could face a possible war from the United States over its nuclear violations. The region faced the imminent threat of U.S. strikes and possible Israeli declaration of war as the non proliferation debate picked up pace in the United States and a case was made for the next U.S. war. All this remained a distinct reality till the recent Geneva Joint Action Plan 2014 agreed by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States. The joint action plan is a result of almost three years of deliberations between E3+E3 and Iran to help restore the transparency measures and the normalisation of Iran’s relations with the West.
The negotiating process remained slow paced and almost intractable as Iran retained its original position to enrich uranium and reprocess and the U.S. position to use punitive measures to enhance cooperation and compliance. The current agreement has been divided into three phases the first step, (six months of bilateral cooperation measures by each side to be followed by a comprehensive agreement and third the period ending the time frame of the comprehensive agreement.
Arguments had been made the hardliners that the transparency measures offered by Iran would not be sufficient and likewise the corresponding removal of restrictive measures (legal in nature) could not be removed by the EU and the U.S. in the given time frame. Hence normalisation of Iran–U.S. relations was to be a time consuming effort.
All of this flew out in the face of the speed with which EU has taken the first measure and as represented by the statement of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, Catherine Ashton, that ‘Iran has implemented the nuclear-related measures set out in the agreement and we have adopted the necessary legislation to suspend certain sanctions for a period of six months.’ As part of the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action agreed by Iran and leading western countries, which entered into force on 27th of January, 2014, the EU Council suspended certain EU restrictive measures against Iran for a period of six months.
The sanctions relief is part of the EU’s implementations towards the six month initial deal with Iran, seen as part of the first step towards a comprehensive solution to address concerns about the Iranian nuclear program. In comparison, Iran has to take a series of transparency measures as well.
The interesting difference is that the series of steps taken by Iran are not legally binding and unilateral in nature. In short, no additional confidence building measures (CBM) than the ones defined in the joint action plan will be carried out and, in short, will be merely a delay in the Iranian nuclear capability if it aims to develop a nuclear weapons program.
The deal allows Iran access to the global nuclear market as a legitimate actor. And in effect Iran has already passed the nuclear threshold and the centre of the Iran U.S. and EU dissent was not the nuclear program but the overall importance of Iran to the geo strategic realities and the convergence of the U.S. interests towards the new regional order with Iran in the centre as balancer to emerging security architecture in the middle east and Central south Asia.
Reservations were made that perhaps the first step may not be sufficient towards reaching the miles stones required for a final comprehensive solution as stated in the Joint Action Plan. The argument was that the first step may be prolonged by mutual consent between the Iran and the E3/EU+3.t This has been replaced by an unprecedented speed of legal action to instill the sanctions relief.
The EU’s decision has lifted the following restrictive measures:
• Eliminate the prohibition on the provision of insurance and transport, in relation to Iranian crude oil sales to its current customers.
• Removal on the prohibition on the import, purchase or transport of Iranian petrochemical products and related services has been suspended.
• Suspension of the prohibition on the provision of the vessels and the transport of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products.
• The ban on trade in gold and precious metals with the Iranian government, its public bodies and the Central Bank of Iran has also been suspended. This has increased ten folds the thresholds for authorizing financial transfers to and from Iran with the purpose in order to ease legitimate trade with Iran.
• The suspension will last for a period of six months during which relevant contracts will have to be executed.
• The legal acts adopted by the Council will be published on 27 January in the EU Official Journal and enter into force the same day.
• The remainder of the EU sanctions against Iran as well as EU sanctions applied in the EU, to EU nationals including entities incorporated under the law of a member state remains in force.
In comparison to this, as a first step, Iran has to take a series of measures as well:
• Convert half of its existing enriched uranium to 20% and downgrade as oxide for fuel fabrication, leading to a down blend to an enrichment level of no more than five percent.
• Freeze production of nuclear fuel to not more than five percent for the duration of six months
• No new advancements in its enrichment facilities in Nantaz, Fordow and Arak Reactor, designed by IAEA as IR 40.
• Increased and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities and uranium mines and mills, in short enhanced access of the IAEA inspectors for design information verification, interim inventory verification, physical inventory verification and unannounced inspections to secure offline surveillance records at Nantaz and Fordow
• Conclusion of the safeguards approach for Arak
• Description of each building on the nuclear site, the scale of operations for each locations information on uranium mines and mills and source material
• No new locations for the uranium enrichment
• No new reprocessing facilities and last but not the least Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D activities, which are not designed for the accumulation of enriched uranium.
The list of the Iranian actions are not half as exhaustive as the steps of actions expected from the P5 plus 1. These are:
• No new nuclear related sanctions from the UN security council, the EU and the U.S.
• Pause efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oils sales, enabling Iran’s current customers to purchase current average amounts of crude oil and repatriation of an greed amount of revenue held abroad, (for such oil sales suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.)
• Suspension of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto industry as well sanctions on associated services
• License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for civil aviation and associated services on Iran, including repairs and safety operations
• Suspension of U.S. and EU sanctions on petrochemicals, precious metals and gold
• Establish a financial channel for humanitarian goods using Iran’s oil revenues that are frozen abroad, including tuition payments for the Iranian students and payments of Iran’s UN dues
• And increase the EU threshold for non sanctioned trade with Iran
The time frame for the Joint Action Plan agreement has been set for six months only for the two sides. However, the sanctions removed and agreements signed between EU member states and EU will remain valid till the dates of the agreements. The petro related sanctions, including those on the sales of precious metals and gold, and the sanctions placed on the Iranian auto and aviation industry will also to be removed over the course.
The phased agreement is not as phased as it was termed but is based on full speed ahead to bring Iran back into the international legitimate powers, as new regional power house based on its financial credentials and security presence in the multiple regional security complexes.
In the net effect of the Joint Action Plan agreement, following realities are of importance:
• Iran’s primary claim that Iran has the right to enrich uranium as per the NPT articles is validated and now it will continue to develop its nuclear program in light of this.
• It provides much needed legality to the Iranian nuclear program and global access to the nuclear market.
• The Joint Action Plan is, in effect, based on bilateral and trilateral agreements involving the U.S., EU and the UNSC led initiatives and not an international binding treaty arrangement or a safeguards frame work binding the Iranian program.
Non-proliferation concerns were not central to the U.S., EU Iran nuclear controversy (as these have not been completely addressed). Iran has and will remain central to the geo strategic designs of the united states in the region.
Iran is likely to play a central in the new regional security order where perhaps the new role will be defined by the U.S. failures and interests in Afghanistan, Iraq and the middle east.
The emergence of Iran as the stronghold of U.S. is likely to be counter balance to other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Israel and Pakistan. The U.S. will remain relevant to new security order and will enhance its options with the inclusion of Iran in the new great game. (the rapid unraveling of the decade long sanctions regime is indicative of this new reality.)
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the Joint Action Plan is a step by step approach towards bringing Iran back into the fold of the international community as a strong economic partner. This will have consequences not only on Iran-U.S. relations but also on the end game in Afghanistan, the redrafting of the Middle Eastern security map and the overlapping of South and Middle Eastern security map.
For Pakistan, the consequences would be immense if Iran becomes the next U.S. strategic partner. This will have implications for Islamabad’s objectives not only in Afghanistan but also for the potential energy dreams from Kasghar to Gawadar.
Lastly, it will have an impact in terms of the Iranian, Indian and Russian convergence of interests in the region albeit at the expense of the existing security relations in the region. It would not be inaccurate to conclude that the Joint Action Plan agreement is not just a nuclear deal but is in fact the beginning of a strategic cooperation which can change the security map of South and Central Asia and Middle East.
The writer is the Director General of South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) think tank based in Islamabad.
