June, 2012

On Pak US relations: Redefining the meaning of turbulent

On Pak US relations: Redefining the meaning of turbulent

Dr Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi

 

US policy towards Pakistan twists and turns like a roller coaster, given the peculiar love-hate relationship it has with the country. The relations between the two were very cooperative for a while after 9/11. However, that did not last and there are now new realities to contend with. Washington’s assessment of Islamabad has drastically changed and vice versa. America has tried to limit the scope of Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan and has given priority to India – a great irritant for the Pakistan Army. This is but one of the US’ many missteps in its Pakistan policy. The Pakistani military establishment was also not happy over coining of the term ‘AfPak’ by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the late envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to him, both countries were part of a single global war (whereas Pakistan’s military wanted to include the Kashmir dispute as part of the envoy’s regional mandate).

Obama’s global agenda and the wars being fought in the region direly needed the Pakistan Army’s support, given that its role was of a prime nature, and more and more military to military contacts were expected. However, the Pakistan Army’s regional agenda of keeping a check on India was completely ignored by Obama. He followed the policy of his predecessor, President Bush, by giving priority to India not only in South Asia but also in Afghanistan - the soft belly and backyard of Pakistan. Thus, Obama’s global agenda never accommodated Pakistan’s regional agenda. Hence, a break took place at a very strategic time; a time when the endgame in Afghanistan is in the offing and any game plan without Pakistan could doomed to be a complete failure. Military to military contacts were developed very late. By now, the adversary is stronger and also fully understands and sees the gulf between the allies.

After the November 26, 2011 Salala check post incident, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) demanded an unconditional apology from the US, an immediate cessation of drone attacks and infiltration into Pakistani territory while also recommending the levying of strict conditions on the use of supply routes across the country. Whatever the other issues and no matter how much racketeering is done around them, it is the re-opening of these supply routes that is the real bone of contention between these two countries. Islamabad’s decision to shut down two key border crossings has resulted in the US and NATO using the alternate northern routes which is much longer and much costlier. In an article published by the Associated Press in January 19, 2012, the Pentagon revealed new figures that the approximate cost of using the northern route ran well into $104 million dollars per month whereas the Pakistani route cost them approximately $17 million – a whopping difference of $87 million. Thus, the US is getting tetchier where the question of reopening of the routes is concerned but Pakistan also wants to use this leverage to get the best deal it can.

Recently, a number of US officials and diplomats met Pakistan’s Prime Minister Gilani seeking a solution that would lead to a resumption of supplies through the transit lines to NATO forces in Afghanistan. In this context on May 13, 2012, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander Gen. John Allen, Afghan Gen. Muhammad Karimi and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani attended a tripartite commission. All of the three sides agreed on implementing border control mechanisms while the restoration of the NATO supplies also came under discussion.

Though such meetings of high official are routine, this tripartite commission is particularly important because Pak-US relation has become quite edgy since the beginning of year 2011 (It is after a long time that a major non-NATO ally was reluctant in saying “yes” to its so-called overlord – the US). This tripartite meeting could have been helpful in ironing out some of these edges; the other two participants in the tripartite meeting were to an extent positive that General Kayani would understand the precarious situation in Afghanistan and would immediately cast his vote in favor of reopening NATO supply routes. But they got a totally unexpected response from Gen Kayani when he said that the issue would be decided in light of the PCNS’ recommendations.

Since the US failed in getting its desired outcome through other means, it resorted to its tried and tested pressure tactics. Approving a bill that would prohibit the preferential procurement of goods and services from Pakistan and indirectly threatening Pakistan that it would not be invited to participate in Chicago summit are just two instances of US strong-arming. In a similar vein, the American Congress also passed many a resolution to pressurize Pakistan. Resolutions that seek to restrict military and economic aid to Pakistan or those that link restoration of the aid to the reopening of NATO supply routes, or even those such as the one that took note of the Balochistan situation are examples of this pressurization.

This Pak-US war of nerves started recently and accelerated due to the US’ coercive diplomacy towards Islamabad. But even in such psychological warfare, deterrence cannot be created unless the target chooses to be deterred. Thus, given Pakistan’s persistence and diplomatic tactics, it was able to wrest an invitation to attend the Chicago Summit from the US. It would’ve been completely unreasonable to exclude Pakistan while deciding the endgame in Afghanistan; Pakistan is after all a state that has helped the US a lot in this war and suffered much on its count. The fact that Pakistan is very important to restoring peace in Afghanistan was acknowledged by someone no less important than the NATO Secretary General, Andreas Rassmussen, during the Chicago Summit. He said, “Pakistan has an important role in ensuring enduring peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and in facilitating the completion of the transition process.”

Given that Pakistan is integral to the process of ending the war, both the countries must mend their relations and approach their differences and issues with pragmatism and circumspection. The issue of the US apology continues to be a thorn. Let’s look at it practically: one understands the US’ compulsions and its domestic pressures. After the May 2nd incident, Pakistan’s credibility and approval took a serious hit in the international arena in general and in the US in particular. Thus, it cannot be easy for the US President to extend an apology to a country so disliked by the US public. Now that they are an impasse, I believe it is time for a measure that will be face-saving for both the countries. The NATO chief must take the lead in offering an official apology to Pakistan over the Salala incident. Technically, all the forces (including the US forces) in Afghanistan come under NATO; hence, its apology may be accepted as it will tantamount to an apology from all the NATO member countries including the US. But the other issue that is a bigger and sharper thorn is that of the NATO supply routes – if Pakistan is willing to soften its stance about the apology, the US must reciprocate by offering a higher fee for the reopening of NATO supply routes. It must be give-and-take; that is the only way both nations will appear to save face as they will be compromising without letting up too much on their respective stances.

Relations must be put back on track but both countries must also be attuned to why relations reached such a low ebb in the first place. Military relations are central to answering this question but they are just one aspect. The US must be sensitive to Pakistan’s role in the war on terror and not be dismissive of it as this exacerbates the trust deficit which in turn embattles relations. It’s important to understand that Pakistan is the most affected country in the war against terror. Many still contend that it was the flawed US policies in the region, especially in Afghanistan, which resulted in the tribal areas of Pakistan becoming a hatchery for terrorists. It is argued that imperialist policies, ill-conceived military operations and drone strikes that result in collateral damage have contributed to radicalization in the areas.

Since the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan’s tribal belt has been subject to increasing radicalization. Like many in the Islamic world, the tribal people in Pakistan too were outraged by the images and stories of Americans and the British troops occupying Afghanistan and killing Afghan people.

Thus, numerous jihadists flocked to Afghanistan at the height of the war on terror and got their first combat experience. Many more that stayed at home were radicalized by listening to horror stories from Afghanistan. Moreover, the way Pashtuns were treated by being conflated with the Taliban also contributed to the radicalization of many. The allied forces could not understand the fact that while a majority of the Taliban may have been Pashtun, but all Pashtuns residing in Afghanistan were not the Taliban. A discriminative approach during the initial years of the US invasion in Afghanistan mustered enemies for the US and the effects of this are still seen on the battlefield. More Pashtuns are partaking in the insurgency than any other ethnic group in Pakistan.

Pakistan has always had a weak control on its tribal areas and has never been able to fully establish its writ on the peripheral regions. Ill-organized and poorly planned military operations have led to a further deterioration in the situation in the region. Conflicting military strategies of the US and Pakistan, especially the drone attacks policy, have badly affected the tribal areas and has resulted in the locals losing trust in both the countries and their military establishments. Al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) have taken advantage of the chaos and trust-deficit to build an emergent power base in different region of the tribal areas (South Waziristan, Khyber Agency, Bara, Mohmand Agency etc). The Bannu jailbreak is ample testimony to that.

The military contacts between Pakistan, US, Afghanistan and ISAF must be a routine matter till international forces wind up their business in Afghanistan. Since terrorists have established power bases in the region as mentioned, engagement between the involved parties is of utmost importance. But Pakistan will have to answer tough some questions like what can it further do and will do to aid international efforts for stability in Afghanistan in the forthcoming years. Other critical questions which are repeatedly asked of Pakistan and will continued to be asked are about terrorist safe havens and border control mechanisms (border control is a difficult issue and the Pakistan Army may take its time in expressing its views on the subject. Thus, this issue May result in the US losing patience). Though Pakistan has long been blamed and doubted, it’s high time that these questions must be cleared. It is only then that Pakistan and the Pakistan Army will be included in any future joint strategy. This would also indicate that the Pakistan Army is ready to aid the Afghan reconciliation process and that it is willing to play by the rules of international community in Afghanistan, keeping in view its national interests.

But military engagement will be futile without effective diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is not just talking to the other party. It also includes giving effective, assertive and in-time responses to the other country. In the current scenario, a foreign policy based on realism with multi-pronged approach will be a winning strategy. This is the lesson our policymakers must understand. But they can’t be slow in coming to this understanding. Given that the country is not only plagued by a security crisis but economic and political crises too, we don’t have the luxury of delaying important decisions.

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