Sheikh Waqqas Akram
The last minute invitation for President Zardari, for participation in the Chicago Conference on Afghanistan, held on 20th, 21st of May, and the smug US State Department announcement that Pakistan had “endorsed the conclusion” but had not yet signed a deal to reopen NATO’s Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC), provided ample understanding to explain the slippery ground being tread by country’s leadership.
The public anger at the ‘Shahadat’ of its 24 soldiers at Salala caused by a recklessly casual aerial assault, articulated through a demand for apology by the National Assembly, which duly linked it with opening up of NATO’s supply routes, has to be balanced against an arrogant US refusal to oblige and yet her desire to make Pakistan buckle under the impact of pressure tactics, defines the prevalent conundrum.
The loss of life through “friendly fire” essentially occurs accidentally and even as the US tends to treat non-American blood rather cheaply, it should present no embarrassment in offering an apology. The caveat , ostensibly, is the dynamics of the election year in US, making it hard for Obama to swallow his pride and make up where his corner is busy propping him up as a steely resolved president in the realm of national security issues.
Pakistan’s position on reopening of GLOCs is not only principled and shaped by the weight of her public opinion but bears an unassailable authenticity as well. The strength of the ground infrastructure bestows upon her a position of strength to negotiate from. Even as the US military and the State Department, in the immediate aftermath of closure of the GLOCs, tried to underplay the importance of Pakistan, within six months the pain of constricted flow resulting into piling up of backlog is beginning to bite.
Since November 2011, the Main Supply Route (MSR) for the US supplies has been the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which originates at the ports of Latvia or Georgia. That requires the cooperation of Russia and a clutch of Central Asian States through which it passes. These arrangements impose strategic constraints; opening the door for Russia to influence the US plans for withdrawal and forcing the American hand by imposing the need to separately cobble bilateral arrangements with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This is easier said than done since these Central Asian States continue to remain under Russian influence and relatively inflexible to US diktat. An enhanced US dependence on Russia to achieve a clean break in Afghanistan comes with a price tag in a scenario of emerging foreign policy disagreements between Washington and Moscow, particularly over Syria and the US plan for a Europe-based missile defense system.
Notwithstanding the emerging rhetoric to the contrary, the strategic importance of Pakistan-based GLOCs has increased in the backdrop of the planned withdrawal of the major US contingent from Afghanistan by end 2014. The US military operations in Afghanistan have been over a decade’s duration and, resultantly, a large pile up of operational and logistical installation, materials and stores has accumulated in Afghanistan. This massive accumulation of load has now to be dismantled and shipped back to the US mainland – a logistical nightmare of astronomical proportions; placing the importance of the Pakistani supply conduit in the focus of an enhanced importance.
The situation is compounded by the fact that the countries providing the NDN outlets have only agreed to allow transit for the “non-lethal” supplies and “wheeled armored vehicles”, much restricting the operational flexibility and logistical utility of the Northern Route.
Then there are the factors of the routes’ capacity, time and the cost to be factored in and accommodated. As per the US’ Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Lt. Gen Raymond Mason, “The NDN is three to four times more expensive because it is three to four times lengthier.” The Russian connection doesn’t come cheap; according to some estimates, the volume of cargo moving through the country is providing Russian freight companies with more than $1 billon a year in business. In his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee during February, Gen. William M Fraser, the Commander of the US Transportation Command testified that the withdrawal from Afghanistan would be impossible without reopening the Pakistani routes.
Pakistan has a strong hand of cards which it has to play with finesse; avoiding the trap of an emotional response. It has its legitimate interests in Afghanistan, which envision a stable and secure neighbor on its Western flank where the Government has a primacy for Pashtuns and a circumscribed Indian ingress. It has also to ensure that once the US leaves, the transition takes place with due order so that a civil war doesn’t ensue which is bound to burden it with the weight of millions of refugees it can ill afford on its soil.
These interests are best served when it evolves a modus vivendi with the US and synthesize its objectives within the overall ambit of US goals. A state of acrimony and belligerence vis-à-vis US will certainly not help. While doing so Pakistani leadership has to be mindful of the caveat of an overwhelming public opinion duly reflected by the National Assembly demands that call for an expression of apology by the US before the supply routes can be reopened.
Nothing comes for free in international relations and Pakistan should make it obvious that the days of Pakistan’s taken-for-granted subservience are over. Pakistan and US must work together to uphold the supremacy of Parliament in Pakistan by showing deference to the will of the people by getting around the issue of apology which carries a tremendous symbolic value. Once it is principally agreed, the two countries can work out an acceptable format. The imperative of the US elections notwithstanding, there is nothing derogatory in store for the US to feel the remorse for killing of Pakistani soldiers through mistake of its blundering troops as well as expressing it eloquently. Getting around the apology issue through consensus is important for Pakistan as well US. Only then, the listing Pak-US relations will recover to an even keel.
