Sate within a state?
The people versus the deep state
RASUL BAKHSH RAIS
The military and the intelligence agencies in Pakistan are known to be autonomous of the state, more when we make transition to civilian rule. It is questionable though how autonomous they are, and whether or not their autonomy, meaning weak or non-existent oversight of the civilian authorityover what they do and don?t do, is issue specific or across the board. The basic element of any democratic transition is that the military and all its affiliated institutions are subordinate to the elected governments. This subordination in post-military regimes, and particularly in countries with long, repeated spells of military rule, like Pakistan is neither easy nor it is likely to happen in one go. But it must happen, sooner than later, if the country is to move forward on democratic path. It is as much necessary for the stability, integrity and progress of the country as it is for the armed forces, a real arm of strength for any country, and more so for Pakistan that faces many security challenges, internal as well as external.
The ?state within state? affair, has created a gulf between the democratic political forces in the country that have support of the people and have constitutional legitimacy to rule the country, and the armed forces, an institution of the state where individuals occupy position as a result of appointment. Any rift, confrontation, division, and even the two looking as separate organs within any state, not only creates the impression of state within state but works against the spirit of national solidarity and unity.
Sadly, the history of Pakistan is such that the armed forces and the political society, the parts of it that have enjoyed public support manifested through popular elections have diverged, conflicted and distrusted each other. It is not a sign of any healthy state-society relations, and not even of a national security state that Pakistan gradually emerged into because of its regional policy, conflicts with India, war in Afghanistan and alliances with the Western world.
For any state to be effective, grounded in society and to have true, proper and genuine love and allegiance of its citizens, it must function under a constitution, must serve their interests and keep their pleasures, welfare and comforts before anything else. A state serving itself or serving interests of a section of a society or one or few dominant institutions of the state loses that commitment and loyalty of the citizens. What the history informs us is that patriotism doesn?t come about by singing songs, writing poetry and displaying life size portraits of ruling generals and politicians but results from state being responsive and responsible?meaning representative and constitutional.
This is not, however, the view of the four Chiefs of Army Staff from Ayub Khan to Pervez Musharraf, and scores of other generals who abetted, aided and ran military regimes in Pakistan for more than thirty years. In their convoluted logic they saw a tension between democracy and development, between democracy and security and between democracy and good governance. If we carefully examine their political beliefs and the record of what they have done to this country, it will be clear that they ran against history of mankind, against global trends of political development, and ultimately against the human spirit to be free and determine its political destiny. Instead, the generals wanted to determine for the Pakistanis because they arrogantly appropriated a fundamental constitutional right of the nation. And they played every trick, every manipulation on the cook-books of the military regime to manipulate politics, create fear, fragment political parties and undermine every democratic institution. Most of the problems that Pakistan faces today are structural in nature, created overtime by four military regimes.
One of the stubborn legacies that we must overcome, and that doesn?t seem to be leaving us, is ?state-within-state? situation. For that to happen we must establish supremacy of the elected civilian institutions?the Parliament and political executive, the cabinet. We know they may have personal defects, there can be issues of incompetence, and even corruption, but for democracy to succeed and the country to make progress they must have power to decide, power to implement and power to frame a vision for the country. Cumulatively, our democratic governments have done better, spending considerable time on cleaning the structural mess left over by the generals. Consider the domestic, regional and international challenges that Z A Bhutto faced after the separation of Pakistan, or Benazir Bhutto faced when she got power in 1988 after the end of the third military regime, one of the most divisive and ruthless.
Let us not go by speculations about the state-within-state debate but look at some hard political facts. And second, to make Pakistan secure for democracy, we must take appropriate, bold and determined steps. These are the two aspects that we now turn to. The first set of facts comes from the four military takeovers. Who will or can deny this? They used self-created acts, courts, laws, constitutions, political resources of state, both coercion and patronage to legitimize their rule, stay in power and rule the country.
Second set of evidence comes from the Mehrangate affair, a case before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This case suggests that while no general occupied the executive position, and they were merely functionaries of the state in uniform, they pulled the strings from behind to manipulate electoral process?one of the sacred institutions of any democracy?of the country. The then president?a man cultivated to that position by the military, the Chief of Army Staff, and the Inter Services Intelligence actually stole hundreds of millions from a national bank and conspired against a free and fair electoral process in the country. This ugly spot, including many others, cannot be washed off and will never be, and those involved in this conspiracy cannot be left out of accountability, which is so far tailor-made for the elected officials in our legislatures.
Let me re-stress my idea?for Pakistan to succeed and progress, democracy must succeed and progress, and for democracy to succeed and progress, we must establish constitutional supremacy of the democratically elected governments. No institution of the state, and let us not mince words about it, the military and any of its sub-institution cannot function autonomously on any domestic, regional or international issue. And that is not possible without ending the ?state within state? condition, if and when it exists or manifests itself in any form. There are two ways to end the ?state within state? political fix that Pakistan has found itself in. First is that those involved in such affairs?the four coups and the Mehrangate for which we have the evidence, must be punished under law. Article 6 of the Constitution is not for students of law and history but for its violators. Starting with legal accountability against the coup-makers and their helpers, we must work hard to build a social and political consciousness against the military rule and in support of democracy, no matter how flawed, defective, weak and corrupt the later is. This is about Pakistan?s future.
Finally, we need to build popular trust in democracy and that cannot be done with slogans alone. For building trust in democracy, the democratic governments must perform better than they have, at least in two vital areas, economy and delivery of social services.
The writer is an academic and teaches at LUMS.
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